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The Clean Sports Act of 20051 (CSA) is Congress' decisive response
to the increasing use of illegal performance-enhancing substances by
professional athletes. When discussing performance-enhancing sub-
stances in sports, whether professional or amateur, it is important to
keep in mind that not all of the substances are illegal. 2 Some over-the-
counter substances, such as creatine, are openly used without any
repercussions. 3 Thus, any statement regarding the use of performance-
enhancing substances most likely includes legal and illegal substances,
unless otherwise indicated.
Performance-enhancing substances are not a new phenomenon in
athletics. The Aztecs and the ancient Greeks looked for substances to
give them a competitive advantage, and the practice has only grown
since then.4 The practice has evolved to such an extent that it is now
deeply embedded in the global athletic culture.5 As a result of the
history of performance-enhancing substances, it seems unrealistic to
rely on a law to rid sports of the practice.
It is widely believed that anabolic steroids are the most widely used
of the relevant illegal substances, evidenced by the United States
Anti-Doping Agency's (USADA) 2007 findings. 6 The use of illegal
substances, such as anabolic steroids, by professional athletes to get a
competitive advantage has occurred since the 1960s. Ben Johnson, a
Canadian sprinter who tested positive for steroids in the 1988 Seoul
1. Clean Sports Act, S. 1114, 109th Cong. (2005).
2. Dr. Jason J. Koch, Performance-enhancing: Substances and Their Use Among Adolescent
Athletes, 9 PEDIATRICS IN REV. 310, 311, Sept. 2002, available at http://pedsinreview.aappublica-
tions.org/cgilcontent/ful/23/9/310.
3. Id.
4. "Aztec athletes and warriors ate human hearts to give them strength in battle and competi-
tion. Ancient Greek Olympians used special mushrooms they believed gave them added power.
In the 1800s European cyclists used heroin, cocaine, and ether-soaked tablets to enhance their
performance." Id. at 310.
5. Id. at 311-2.
6. See United States Anti-Doping Agency's 2007 Annual Report, http://www.usantidoping.
org/files/active/who/annual-report_2007.pdf (last visited September 25, 2009).
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Olympic Games, was the first mainstream athlete to test positive for
steroids.7 The first widely publicized case of extended steroid use was
by Lyle Alzado,8 a National Football League (NFL) star in the 1970
and 1980s who died of brain cancer. Following Alzado's story, came
the news that the female East German swimmers, who dominated the
swimming world for over a decade, used steroids, after some of their
children were born with birth defects. 9
The use of performance-enhancing substances has evolved even
more, as it has touched virtually every sport, including golf10 and Na-
tional Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR)."' Addi-
tionally, instead of the most rudimentary anabolic steroids, athletes
use Human Growth Hormone (HGH), Tetrahydrogestrinone (THG),
Erthyropoietin (EPO) and other forms of synthetically manufactured
substances to get a competitive advantage. 1 2 President George W.
Bush thought that the problem of steroids in professional sports was
so prevalent that he addressed it in his January 20, 2004 State of the
Union Address.13 One of the problems is that many new synthetic
substances are undetectable, as there is currently not a test that is ca-
pable of detecting their presence. 14 Ultimately, this paper concludes
that while Congress should not have to pass legislation to prevent the
use of illegal performance-enhancing substances in professional
sports, it is within its constitutional power to do so. However, the CSA
is unconstitutional, as it violates the Fourth Amendment.
Section II of this paper explains the current state of affairs of per-
formance-enhancing substances in professional sports and the CSA.
Section III of this paper analyzes the constitutionality of the CSA by
discussing the extent of the use of illegal performance-enhancing sub-
7. 1988: Johnson Stripped of Olympic Gold, BBC, Sept. 27, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthis
day/hildates/stories/september/27/newsid_2539000/2539525.stm.
8. Mike Puma, Not the Size of the Dog in the Fight, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/classic/biogra-
phy/s/AlzadoLyle.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2008).
9. Michael Janofsky, OLYMPICS; Coaches Concede That Steroids Fueled East Germany's
Success in Swimming, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1991, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/full
page.html?res=9DOCE1DA1731F93OA35751C1 A967958260&sec=health&spon=&pagewanted=
all.
10. See Steve DiMeglio, Gary Player: I know of steroids in golf, USA TODAY, July 18, 2007,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/golflpga/2007-07-18-player-commentsN.htm.
11. See NASCAR toughens drug policy, to test drivers before start of '09, CBS SPoRTs, Sept. 20,
2008, http://www.sportsline.comlautoracing/story/10986934.
12. See United States Anti-Doping Agency's Athlete Handbook, http://www.usantidoping.
org/files/active/athletes/athlete-handbook.pdf (last visited September 25, 2009).
13. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 40 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 94, 100 (Jan. 20, 2004).
14. New Cases of Undetectable Steroids, CBS, Nov. 15, 2007, http://cbsl3.com/local/steroids.
athletes.2.569340.html.
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stances in professional sports; whether, it requires the major league
sports to act at the Government's discretion; whether, the required
urinalysis is a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment; the
extent of the intrusion upon the athletes' private interest; and
whether, the Government presents a compelling interest.
Finally, Section III discusses whether, after balancing the private
and Governmental interests, the required urinalysis is an unreasona-
ble search under the Fourth Amendment and discusses the possible
alternatives to the CSA. While this paper is not intended to advocate
for the legalization of illegal performance-enhancing substances, it ul-
timately arrives at the conclusion that the CSA is unconstitutional and
merely a threat, intended to force the professional leagues to imple-
ment more stringent drug testing programs.
II. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
A. Clean Sports Act of 2005
The CSA is Congress' attempt to regulate performance-enhancing
substances under its authority to regulate interstate commerce. The
Senate referred the CSA to the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation.' 5 Congress has regulated professional and ama-
teur sports for several years.16 The CSA states that its purpose is "to
protect the integrity of professional sports and the health and safety of
athletes generally by establishing minimum standards for the testing
of steroids and other performance-enhancing substances by profes-
sional sports leagues."' 7
The CSA states that the Senate found the use of anabolic steroids
and other performance-enhancing substances by minors to be a public
health problem of national significance.' 8 The CSA states that experts
estimate that 500,000 teenagers have used performance-enhancing
substances and based upon the testimony of parents of minors, who
used performance-enhancing substances, and medical and health ex-
perts, the use of performance-enhancing substances has a number of
adverse health side-effects. 19 It also states that studies and surveys
suggest that the use of performance-enhancing substances by profes-
sional athletes results in increase use by adolescents and that the
adoption of a strict drug testing policy by professional sports leagues
15. Clean Sports Act, S. 1114, 109th Cong. (2005).
16. Id. § 2(a)(14).
17. Id. § 2(b).
18. Id. § 2(a)(1).
19. Id. § 2(a)(2).
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would reduce the use of performance-enhancing substances by adoles-
cents. 20 Thus, even though the CSA does not state specifically that
one of its main purposes is to deter the use of performance-enhancing
substances by adolescent athletes, the Congressional findings and ex-
trinsic evidence lead to the conclusion that it is the main thrust behind
the proposed legislation.21
The CSA mandates that, upon its establishment, all four major pro-
fessional sports leagues and the United States Boxing Commission
adopt its minimum testing standards.22 The minimum standards are
those established by the USADA. 23 These minimum standards require
random suspicionless testing for all prohibited substances at least five
times per year for each athlete.24 Presumably, the method of testing
will be urine testing, as it is the method currently used by the
USADA; however, blood testing is also a possibility because the
USADA is currently developing new tests. 25 The penalty an athlete
faces for his or her first positive test is an immediate suspension of at
least 2 years. 26 For a second violation, the penalty is a lifetime ban
from all major professional leagues. 27 The penalty for a leagues' fail-
ure to comply with the act is a $1,000,000 fine for each violation.28
Additionally, each league must report its testing policies and proce-
dures to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of
the Senate; and the Committee on Energy, and the Committee on
Government Reform of the House of Representatives. 29 Similar
20. See Id. § 2(a)(5).
21. See S. 1114.; Lindsay J. Taylor, Note, Congressional Attempts to "Strike Out" Steroids:
Constitutional Concerns About the Clean Sports Act 49 ARIz. L. REV. 961, 961 (2007); "Repre-
sentative Tom Davis, Chairman of the House Committee on Government Reform and a sponsor
of the Clean Sports Act of 2005, stated that Congress's 'primary focus remains on the message
being sent to children." Joshua Peck, Note, Last Resort: The Threat of Federal Steroid Legisla-
tion-Is the Proposed Legislation Constitutional?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777, 1781 (2006) (citing
Restoring Faith in America's Pastime: Evaluating Major League Baseball's Efforts to Eradicate
Steroid Use: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Government Reform, 109th Cong. 7 (2005) (state-
ment of Rep. Tom Davis, Chairman, House Comm. on Government Reform)); Tiffany D. Lips-
comb, Note, Can Congress Squeeze the "Juice" Out of Professional Sports? The Constitutionality
of Congressional Intervention into Professional Sports' Steroid Controversy, 69 OHIo ST. L.J. 303,
340-1 (2008).
22. S. 1114 §§ 3(4); 8.
23. Id. § 4(b).
24. Id. § 4(b)(1)(A).
25. USADA Begins Program to Test Body Chemistry, WASH. POST, at E02, Apr. 17, 2008,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/16/AR20080416036
67.html.
26. S. 1114 § 4(b)(7)(A)(i).
27. Id. § 4(b)(7)(A)(ii).
28. Id. § 6(b)(2).
29. Id. § 7(c).
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pieces of legislation have been proposed with slight variations on the
specific procedures in each house of Congress. 30 Many scholars praise
the CSA for different reasons, including its aspiration to protect
America's youth and its economic efficiency.31 Interestingly, many of
these supporters fail to address the obvious Fourth Amendment
implications.
B. The Use of Performance-Enhancing Drugs in
Professional Sports
In the academic community, it is virtually undisputed that illegal
performance-enhancing substances have invaded professional and am-
ateur athletics. Academics also believe that Congress has the author-
ity to address the problem through the commerce clause.32 However,
as much as the problem has grown, evidence indicates that the major-
ity of use in the four major professional sports is limited to baseball
and football. 33 That being said, the implication from testing statistics
and sports insiders is that the problem is more prevalent in the Major
League Baseball (MLB) and minor league baseball players. A number
of current and former major league baseball players have estimated
the use of steroids or HGH by MLB players to be between 40-50%.34
The now deceased Ken Caminiti, the 1996 National League Most Val-
30. See Integrity in Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. (2005); Professional Sports Responsibility
Act of 2005, H.R. 3942, 109th Cong. (2005); Drug-Free Sports Act, H.R. 3084, 109th Cong.
(2005).
31. Denise A. Garibaldi, Ph.D., Symposium, The Challenge and the Tragedy, 40 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 717, 717 (2006); Colin Laitner, Steroids and Drug Enhancements in Sports: the Real Prob-
lem and the Real Solution, 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 192, 210-1 (2006); Joshua
H. Whitman, Note, Winning at All Costs: Using Law & Economics to Determine the Proper Role
of Government in Regulating the Use of Performance-Enhancing Drugs in Professional Sports,
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 459 (2008).
32. See Laitner, supra note 31; See also supra note 19; Joseph M. Saka, Comment, Back to the
Game: How Congress Can Help Sports Leagues Shift the Focus From Steroids to Sports, 23 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 341, 354 (2007); Matthew J. Mitten, Symposium, Drug Testing of
Athletes-An Internal, Not External, Matter, 40 NEw ENG. L. REV. 797, 806 (2006); Allan H.
"Bud" Selig & Robert D. Manfred, Jr., Symposium, The Regulation of Nutritional Supplements
in Professional Sports, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 35, 57-59 (2004).
33. GEORGE J. MITCHELL, DLA PIPER US LLC, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF BASE-
BALL OF AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL USE OF STEROIDS AND OTHER
PERFORMANCE ENHANCING SUBSTANCES By PLAYERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL SUMMARY
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Dec. 13, 2007, http://www.files.mlb.com/summary.pdf [hereinafter
Mitchell Report]; Brent Schrotenboer, UNION-TRIB., Sept. 21, 2008, http://www.signonsandiego.
com/sports/20080921-9999-ls2llist.html.
34. Tom Verducci, Totally Juiced, SPORTS ILLUST., June 3, 2002, available at http://vault.sports
illustrated.cnn.comivault/article/magazine/MAG1025902/index.htm.
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uable Player and admitted steroid user, estimated the use to be as high
as 85%.35
Moreover, the highly touted 2007 Mitchell Report states that in
MLB in 2005, twelve players tested positive for steroids; in 2006, two
players tested positive for steroids; and in 2007, three players tested
positive for steroids.36 The Mitchell Report, by way of testimony and
physical evidence, also connects eighty-seven former and current play-
ers to steroid or HGH use. The discrepancy between the positive test
results and Mitchell Report and player reports illustrate that the MLB
testing program is inadequate.37 After telling Congress that they did
not use illegal performance-enhancing substances, some future MLB
Hall of Fame caliber players tested positive or were linked to purchas-
ing the illegal substances.38 In a comparison of positive tests, accord-
ing to the San Diego Union-Tribune, twenty-two NFL players tested
positive for banned performance-enhancing substances in the same
three-year time period.39
The NFL's drug testing system has been in place for decades and
MLB's drug testing program is in its infancy, as it started in 2002.40
There is no question that the NFL has the most stringent testing pro-
gram, as it received Congressional praise.41 As a result, at least four
NFL players recently tested positive for Bumetanide, which is consid-
ered a masking agent.42 These players received four game suspen-
sions, consistent with the NFL policy. 4 3 These statistics indicate that
the NFL actually catches and punishes offenders at a higher rate than
the MLB. However, the occurrences also suggest that some evasion
takes place in the NFL."
In contrast, the National Hockey League (NHL) has a random test-
ing policy, and in approximately two years of testing, only one player
tested positive for a banned performance-enhancing substance. 45 The
35. Id.
36. Mitchell Report, supra note 33.
37. Id.
38. Rafael Palmeiro tested positive for steroids, and Barry Bonds and Roger Clemens were
linked to the purchase of illegal performance-enhancing substances. Id.
39. Schrotenboer, supra note 33.
40. Mitchell Report, supra note 33.
41. NFL to test for more performance enhancing drugs, ESPN, Jan. 24, 2007, http://www.
sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2741136; Selig, supra note 32, at 54-5.
42. McAllister, Smith, Grant, Texans' Pittman among players testing positive, ESPN, Oct. 26,
2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3661845.
43. Id.
44. Laitner, supra note 31, at 201.
45. Scott Burnside, Debate over NHL's drug testing policy rages on, ESPN, Aug. 6, 2007, http:/
1sports.espn.go.com/nhllcolumns/story?columnist=burnsidescott&id=2963703.
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National Basketball Association (NBA) has a more lax policy on ran-
dom testing and the substances that are tested.46 There are no reports
of an NBA or NHL player being linked to the purchase of a banned
performance-enhancing substance. This indicates that the problem is
primarily limited to the MLB and the NFL.
It is unfortunate that Congress feels legislation is required to make
a serious effort to reduce the use of illegal substances in professional
sports. Each individual league should act as its own watchdog and
adopt the strict policy used by the International Olympic Committee
and the USADA. The Major League Baseball Player's Association
(MLBPA) stifled most of the MLB's attempts to introduce a new pol-
icy. However, in the wake of the Mitchell Report, there has been re-
cent success in negotiations.47 In April of 2008, the MLB and the
MLBPA agreed to a much stricter testing program. 48 The previous in-
ability to find common ground indicates that the MLB wanted Con-
gress to take action, so that it could deny responsibility.49 Marvin
Miller, the former executive director of the MLBPA, would most
likely agree with the theory that the MLBPA stymied the new testing
program but he would likely say that the effort was a good faith at-
tempt to protect the rights of the individual athletes.50 There is also
the notion that that the MLB turned a blind eye to the growing steroid
problem through the 1990s.5 1 If the theory is accurate, the MLB's ac-
tions most likely contributed to the current state of affairs with per-
formance-enhancing substances in the MLB.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CLEAN SPORTS Acr OF 2005
This section analyzes the constitutionality of the CSA and whether
the CSA is the best method to achieve Congress' objectives. There are
four important Fourth Amendment search Supreme Court cases that
have formed the law in the area of drug testing by urinalysis. An anal-
ysis and discussion of each case is necessary because there is not a
clearly identifiable rule on point. While the Congressional findings are
46. Laitner, supra note 31, at 201.
47. Mitchell Report, supra note 33.
48. Steroid use allegations plague Major League Baseball, CBS NEws, http://www.cbsnews.
com/elements/2005/11/16/in depth-sports/timelinelO5OO84_0_main.shtml (last visited Oct. 12,
2008).
49. Peck, supra note 21, at 1777-8.
50. Dave Kindred, Seems Athletes Have Lost Their Legal Legs, L.A. TIMES, D-2, July 4, 2004,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jul/04/sports/sp-dogkindred4; Murray Chass, Steroid
Tests Ignore the 4th Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2005/06/02/sports/baseball/02chass.html.
51. Peck, supra note 21, at 1786.
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significant, they overlook obvious problems, which shall be addressed
in this section. While Congress' findings are entitled to substantial def-
erence, "they are not insulated from meaningful judicial review
altogether." 52
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides that "[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated. . ."53 The Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity and se-
curity of persons against certain arbitrary and invasion acts by officers
of the Government or those acting at their direction.54 Thus, a urinal-
ysis violates the Fourth Amendment if it is an unreasonable search
that is contributable to the Government or a private party acting at
the Government's discretion, but the practice may be permissible if
the Government presents a special exception.55
The first step in the Fourth Amendment analysis is to consider
whether the drug tests are contributable to the Government or a pri-
vate party acting at its discretion, which is addressed in sub-section
A. 5 6 The next step in the analysis is to consider whether the individu-
als' have a diminished expectation of privacy and the nature of the
invasion, to be addressed in sub-section B.5 7 The third step is to ana-
lyze whether the searches are unreasonable, to be addressed in sub-
section C. The final step, to be addressed in sub-section D, is the anal-
ysis of whether the Government presents a special exception.58
A. Contributing the Testing to the Government and a Fourth
Amendment Search
The testing under the CSA is contributable to the Government, as it
requires the professional leagues to act at its discretion. The Fourth
Amendment does not apply to a search by a private party unless the
private party is acting as an instrument or agent of the Government. 59
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, the Supreme Court
found that the issue hinges on the degree of the Government's partici-
52. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 665-6 (1994).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
54. Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
55. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995); Nat'1 Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
56. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 620.
59. Id. at 614 (citing U.S. v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 113-4 (1984)).
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pation in the private party's activities.60 In Skinner, the Court found
that the Government more than adopted a passive position toward the
underlying private conduct, testing by the private railroads. 61 There-
fore, the search in question can be a public one even though the Gov-
ernment did not compel the private party to perform the search.62
As such, the CSA requires the individual professional leagues to act
as agents of the Government in regards to implementing the drug test-
ing policy. 6 3 The CSA's mandatory drug testing for all of the athletes
in the NBA, MLB, NFL and NHL would clearly be "encouragement,
endorsement, and participation" by the Government. 64 Additionally,
the Government seeks to share the fruits; specifically, it seeks to as-
certain the names of each individual player who tests positive.65 Fur-
thermore, the pre-emption of state law and any applicable collective
bargaining agreement strengthens the argument that the private
leagues act as agents of the Government.66
Of course the converse argument is that the leagues are left with the
option of not complying. However, this argument fails because of the
$1,000,000 fine that the CSA imposes for non-compliance. The fine
leaves the leagues with the option of either complying or going out of
business. Lastly, it would be difficult to take notice of the leagues'
reporting requirements and still find that each league is not an agent
of the Government, as each league would be directly communicating
with the Government on the league's compliance. 67 Consequently, a
court would likely find that the CSA requires the individual profes-
sional leagues to act as agents of the Government. Thus, drug testing
under the CSA is a Government search.
The CSA's required urinalysis is a Fourth Amendment search, as it
intrudes upon an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. Gen-
erally, a Government search is a Fourth Amendment search if the per-
son or people have an expectation of privacy and society considers the
60. Id.
61. The Court stated "[tihe Government has removed all legal barriers to the testing author-
ized .. . and indeed has made plain not only its strong preference for testing, but also its desire to
share the fruits of such intrusions." Id. at 615.
62. "ie fact that the Government has not compelled a private party to perform a search does
not, by itself, establish that the search is a private one." Id.
63. Taylor, supra note 21, at 965.
64. The Court "strongly implies that if the government were to compel a private party to do a
search, then the search would probably be considered a search by an agent of the government."
Id.
65. See Id.; Clean Sports Act, S. 1114, 109th Cong. H§ 4, 6 (2005).
66. See S. 1114; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615.
67. See S. 1114 § 7.
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expectation to be reasonable. 68 The collection and testing of urine is a
search under the Fourth Amendment, in the same manner as blood
analysis is, because it intrudes upon a person's reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy, as "there are few activities in our society more per-
sonal or private than the passing of urine."69 As previously stated, the
CSA mandates random testing at least five times per year and the
adoption of the USADA standard of testing,70 which currently uses
urinalysis.7' Additionally, if the USADA were to adopt blood analysis
as a testing method, which there is an indication that it might, the
CSA mandates that the four major professional sports leagues adopt
blood analysis as a testing method. 72 Thus, the CSA tests are subject
to the Fourth Amendment.
The reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment de-
pends on the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the
nature of the search and seizure itself.7 3 Generally, the Government is
prohibited from conducting a search or seizure absent a judicial war-
rant or individualized suspicion; however, searches conducted absent
suspicion of specific individuals have been upheld in "limited circum-
stances." 74 As the testing under CSA is not designed to meet the ordi-
nary needs of law enforcement, a balancing of the intrusion of the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of le-
gitimate Governmental interests is necessary.
Some proponents of the CSA argue that it would not violate the
Fourth Amendment, as the "judicial precedent" for testing high
school students and college athletes "likely applies to professional
sports."75 A court may find that the CSA is constitutional, "but there
is not as much judicial precedent to rely on" as these proponents sug-
gest, because "the only relevant precedents are those that recognize
68. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 360-1 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
69. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (quoting Nat'l Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
668 (1989)).
70. S. 1114, § 4(b)(1)(A).
71. USADA Begins Program to Test Body Chemistry, supra note 25, at E02; "[Pirofessional
leagues would most likely use urinalysis, because it is the current method of testing employed by
all professional sports in the Unite States and by the United States Anti-Doping Agency . .
Taylor, supra note 21, at 965.
72. USADA Begins Program to Test Body Chemistry, supra note 25, at E02.
73. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (citing U.S. v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)).
74. "[Olur cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special govern-
mental needs, beyond the normal law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's
privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to
require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context." Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 665-6; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628-30.
75. Mitten, supra note 32, at 806.
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the special-needs requirement and balance the competing public and
private interests." 76
B. The Private Interest of Professional Athletes and the Nature of
the Invasion
Professional athletes have a diminished expectation of privacy.77
The Supreme Court held that the individual's diminished expectation
of privacy may detract from the unreasonableness of the search.78 The
Court concluded that employees who participate in heavily regulated
industries and public school children, who voluntarily participate in
interscholastic athletic competition, have a diminished expectation of
privacy, as they "have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights
and privileges, including privacy." 79
Case in point, in Skinner, the Court found that the railroad industry
was so heavily regulated for safety, that it created a diminished expec-
tation of privacy for the employees.80 Professional athletics are not
subject to similar regulations. There are neither federal laws regarding
the safety equipment used by professional athletes nor requirements
as to periodic physical examination of employees, the two most impor-
tant regulation factors addressed in Skinner.
In addition, in Vernonia School District v. Action, the Court con-
cluded that public school children who participate in athletics were
subject to four factors, which establish a diminished expectation of
privacy. The elements include the requirement to submit to various
physical examinations, the requirement to be vaccinated, the require-
ment to submit themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than
generally imposed on students and the requirement to participate in
an "element of communal undress," as they dress and undress in the
locker room.81 The Court stated that public schools exercise a degree
of control over students that cannot be exercised over free adults. 8 2 Of
course professional athletes are also subject to numerous physical ex-
aminations and a locker room with an element of "communal un-
dress," but the Government is not responsible for the health and
76. Taylor, supra note 21, at 979.
77. Peck, supra note 21, at 1822.
78. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656; Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; Vernonia Sch. Dist. V. Acton, 515 U.S.
646.
79. "[Tlhe expectations of privacy of covered employees [was] diminished by reason of their
participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety . . ." Skinner, 489 U.S.
at 627; Acton 515 U.S. at 654.
80. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627.
81. Acton, 515 U.S. at 657.
82. Id. at 655.
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safety of athletes in the same manner that it is responsible for
students.
Similarly, in National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, the Court
found that because Customs employees are directly involved in the
interdiction of illegal drugs and carry firearms in the line of duty, they
have a diminished expectation of privacy.83 The Court reasoned that
the employees "reasonably should expect effective inquiry into their
fitness and probity." 84 In contrast, professional athletes entertain the
fans of their respective sport. The athletes are not required to protect
the country's borders, and they are not given the authority to use
deadly force.
Additionally, in Chandler v. Miller, the Court found that because
candidates for public office are subject to constant scrutiny by their
peers, the public and the press, which is beyond the norm of the ordi-
nary work environment, they have a diminished expectation of pri-
vacy.85 Professional athletes undergo similar scrutiny, as their multi-
million dollar salaries and endorsement contracts attract attention
from the media, fans, teams and other players. Thus, as professional
athletes are under constant scrutiny, are subject to physical examina-
tions, participate in an environment of "communal undress," a court
would likely find that professional athletes have diminished privacy
expectations. 86 As a consequence, commentators use the "slippery
slope" argument to argue that if professional athletes have a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy, everyone in the public eye, such as celeb-
rities and musicians, could be subject to similar drug tests.87 While
that argument has some logical force, because professional athletes
should not be subject to the searches based solely on their celebrity
status, a court would likely find it unpersuasive, as the aggregate of
the circumstances show that professional athletes should expect an in-
vasion of privacy.
In Chandler, the Court did not address the invasiveness of the intru-
sion.88 The Court implies that if the individuals voluntarily "give up
privacy," the minimally invasive nature of the test is as important. 89
Therefore, because professional athletes voluntarily submit them-
83. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672.
84. Id. at 672.
85. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321 (1997).
86. Taylor, supra note 21, at 981.
87. Lipscomb, supra note 21, at 336.
88. "In Chandler, the Court did not discuss any limited expectation of privacy for the political
candidates." Peck, supra note 21, at 1808.
89. Id.
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selves to scrutiny and give up privacy, a court could very well conclude
that an analysis of the invasiveness of the procedure is unnecessary.
However, if a court determined that the analysis is necessary, it
would likely find that the procedure for the urinalysis is minimally
invasive, because the samples are collected in a medical environment
and are similar to procedures that are often encountered in the con-
text of a regular physical examination. 90 As the CSA's urinalysis
would likely be conducted under similar circumstances, a court would
most likely find that the procedure is minimally invasive. Neverthe-
less, it could be argued that the CSA's testing requirements are more
invasive than those in Skinner, because after an accident, railway
workers would have reason to believe that they would be tested, and
the CSA testing would be entirely random. 91 However, this argument
would likely fail because of the surrounding circumstances: the height-
ened scrutiny of professional athletes and the minimally invasiveness
of the procedure. The potential seizure of the tested individual will
not be analyzed here, as "not every [G]overnmental interference with
an individual's freedom of movement raises such constitutional con-
cerns that there is a seizure of the person." 92
C. The Governmental Interest for the Testing
The Government does not present a compelling interest in support
of the CSA. In the context of suspicionless drug testing, the Supreme
Court has determined that the Governmental interest for the search
must be a "compelling" one.9 3 The Court has only recognized two
Governmental interests that may represent a "special need" that justi-
fies the departure from the normal requirements; the two interests are
public safety and the protection of sensitive information.9 4 The Gov-
ernmental interest that the CSA presents is most analogous to Chan-
dler, as it is merely intended to serve as a symbol of fair sportsmanship
for America's youth.
The only one of the four Supreme Court cases that involved suspi-
cionless testing in the private sector is Skinner, in which the Govern-
ment had a compelling interest in ensuring public safety by testing the
90. Id. at 1807; Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627-8 (1989); Vernonia
Sch. Dist. V. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995).
91. The Court "strongly implies that if the government were to compel a private party to do a
search, then the search would probably be considered a search by an agent of the government."
Taylor, supra note 21, at 968.
92. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618.
93. Id. at 628.
94. Id. at 628-30; Nat'l Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989); Acton, 515 U.S. at
660-1.
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railroad employees for alcohol and drugs.95 The Federal Railroad Ad-
ministration's (FRA) testing of its employees, after the occurrence of
an accident, was intended "to prevent accidents and casualties in rail-
road operations that result from impairment of employees by alcohol
or drugs."96 In Skinner, the Supreme Court based its decision on sub-
stantial evidence of actual harm that resulted from train accidents,
which involved alcohol or drug use as a contributing factor, and the
fact that effected employees were engaged in a safety-sensitive task. 97
The Court also noted that, under the circumstances of a train accident,
it would be difficult to determine if any employee displayed signs of
alcohol or drug use.98 The Court ultimately determined that the dan-
ger presented by a railroad employee under the influence of alcohol
or drugs is a direct threat to public safety.99
Similarly, in Vernonia, the school district's approval of the testing
policy on the student-athletes for the specific street drugs was in re-
sponse to an "immediate threat."1oo The Court found that the drug
use by the athletes and the danger caused by the drugs represented a
compelling interest for the policy.101 In Vernonia, there was a sharp
increase in the student population's drug use;102 the athletes were the
leaders of the drug culture;10 3 and the targeted drugs were amphet-
amines, marijuana and cocaine. 104
Moreover, in National Treasury, the purpose of the drug testing was
"to deter use among those [employees with the opportunity] for pro-
motion to sensitive positions within the Service and to prevent the
95. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-1.
96. Id.
97. "The FRA also found, after a review of accident investigation reports, that from 1972 to
1983 'the nation's railroads experienced at least 21 significant train accidents involving alcohol or
drug use as a probable cause or contributing factor,' and that these accidents 'resulted in 25
fatalities, 61 non-fatal injuries, and property damage estimated at $19 million (approximately $27
million in 1982 dollars)."' Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607 (quoting 48 Fed.Reg. 30726 (1989)).
98. Id. at 631.
99. "A railway worker who operates trains, maps out routes, or maintains railroad tracks
presents a direct threat to the public if he or she is even slightly impaired. Inebriation may lead
to a mismarked route, the failure to switch the tracks, or poor operation of a train, all of which
could result in a deadly collision." The Court "strongly implies that if the government were to
compel a private party to do a search, then the search would probably be considered a search by
an agent of the government." Taylor, supra note 21, at 969.
100. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648-50 (1995); Subsequently, because of the
"nationwide drug epidemic," the Court expanded on the policy to include public school students
participating in any extra-curricular activity. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Potta-
watomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002).
101. Acton, 515 U.S. at 664-5.
102. "[T]eachers and administrators observed a sharp increase in drug use." Id. at 648.
103. "[A]thletes were the leaders of the drug culture." Id. at 649.
104. Id. at 649-51.
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promotion of drug users to those positions."os The Supreme Court
determined that the Government presented special needs, because the
integrity of the U.S. Customs work force was in danger, and it indi-
rectly facilitates the drug trade.10 6 The Court found that because the
Customs officials are the first line of defense against the smuggling of
illicit drugs into the United States, it is of national interest to ensure
that the they have the highest integrity. 07 This is obviously a more
indirect connection to public safety than the train accidents of
Skinner.
Conversely, in Chandler, the Supreme Court found that the Gover-
nor of Georgia did not present a compelling Governmental interest to
support the Georgia statute that required drug testing for candidates
running for state office. 08 In making the decision, the Court relied on
the lack of a presentation of an indication of a concrete danger.
i. Actual Harm Caused by Performance-Enhancing Substances
Skinner and National Treasury present an almost undeniable Gov-
ernmental interest.109 In contrast, Congress fails to present a direct
threat to public safety in support of the CSA.110 While evidence of
actual harm is not necessity to establish a special need in the interest
of public safety, the Supreme Court certainly indicates that it is highly
persuasive.'I As the CSA expresses, its primary purpose is the pro-
tection of America's youth; out of concern that young athletes are em-
ulating and will continue to emulate professional athletes who use
illegal performance-enhancing substances. 112
While most medical professionals regard steroids and the other ille-
gal performance-enhancing substances as highly dangerous, there is
little to no scientific evidence of actual physical harm attributable to
105. Nat'l Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 646, 666 (1989).
106. Id. at 669-70.
107. Id. at 668.
108. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318-9 (1997).
109. "Skinner and Von Raab present an almost undeniable compelling Governmental inter-
est, and the regulations enacted in these cases directly monitor the compelling interests." Peck,
supra note 21, at 1811.
110. "Though a professional athlete who uses steroids may inadvertently encourage a teen-
ager to engage in similar behavior, a teenager's fate is hardly in the hands of professional ath-
letes in the way a passenger's fate is directly in the hands of railway workers." The Court
"strongly implies that if the government were to compel a private party to do a search, then the
search would probably be considered a search by an agent of the government." Taylor, supra
note 21, at 969.
111. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989); Peck, supra note 21, at
1811-2.
112. Clean Sports Act, S. 1114, 109th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2005).
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their use."13 As previously mentioned, the CSA is aimed at steroids
and HGH. Thus, this discussion will focus on those substances. As a
consequence of the lack of evidence, a small school of thought has
developed, which is led by Dr. Norman Fost, professor of pediatrics
and bioethics at the University of Wisconsin and director of its
Bioethics Program. This school of thought advocates for the accept-
ance of steroids and HGH in adult athletic competition.1 14 Many cases
of known steroid abusers, who died of a rare illness, were mistakenly
attributed to steroid abuse without any medical evidence to support
that conclusion.' 15 There is also little evidence to support one of the
most common beliefs about steroids, which they cause aggressive be-
havior, commonly referred to as "roid rage."' 1 6 In response, anti-ster-
oid critics say "[a]ll steroid users do not experience the same
deleterious effects and many serious problems require months or
years to develop."' 1 7
Highly distinguished medical professionals acknowledge the lack of
information on the substances and say that is why "we have to just be
very respectful of those kinds of drugs." 18 The lack of concrete evi-
dence is most likely the result of the idea that a long term study on
healthy subjects would never be approved and "[i]t would take 20
years to see the outcomes."119 Thus, in response to the claim that ster-
oids cause cancer, Dr. Fost and his associates say "[t]hat's like saying,
113. "With anabolic steroids, for example, there's wide agreement that there are short-term
hormonal effects like hair loss, acne, infertility, and in women, male-pattern body hair and a
lowered voice. But, as Fost points out, these are mostly cosmetic and, except for the voice
changes, usually reversible." Drake Bennett, Are steroids as bad as we think they are?, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2004, available at http://www.boston.comlnews/globe/ideas/articles/2004/12/12/
aresteroidsasbadaswethinkjtheyare/.
114. Norman Fost, Point/Counterpoint: Allow Drugs in Sports, ABC NEWS, Jan. 10, 2008,
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=4116522.
115. "Critics assert that steroids and HGH cause life-threatening harm, but the claims are
wildly exaggerated or simply made up. Lyle Alzado, Exhibit A for the perils of steroids, died of a
brain tumor, but there is not a single medical source showing any association between his tumor
and steroids. We are told repeatedly that steroids cause heart disease and strokes but it is hard to
identify a single elite athlete who suffered either calamity while using steroids. HGH has been
given to half a million children for decades and there is little evidence of any serious harm." Fost,
supra note 114, at $ 4.
116. Charles Yesalis, a steroid expert and epidemiologist at Penn State, doubts the existence
of "roid rage." Charles Leroux, As controversy swirls, medical ethicist remains a center of calm
and certainty, CH. TRIB., Jan. 15, 2008, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/features/lifes-
tyle/chi01l5steroids-fostjanl5,0,2159614.story.
117. Garibaldi, supra note 31, at 726.
118. Quote from Gary Wadler, a professor of clinical medicine at the New York University
School of Medicine and a member of the World Anti-Doping Agency, is one of the medical
professionals who acknowledges the lack of information on the subject. Bennett, supra note 113.
119. Greg Bishop, Steroids issue offers no room in the middle, SEATrLE TIMEs, Oct. 11, 2005,
at 2, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/sports/2002553049_boostethicsl1.htmi.
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'I ate a lot of hot dogs, which is why I got brain cancer.' You can't
claim serious adverse effects based on anecdotes or ethics." 120 That
being said, researchers have done their best to conduct studies aimed
at determining the effects of steroid use. The results of animal re-
search offer a portion of the backing for the argument that steroids
cause aggressive behavior. 121
Additionally, the conclusion that steroids increase heart attacks and
liver damage is a result of studies on the use of anabolic steroids by
men with HIV.122 As these studies were not conducted on healthy
human beings, they are only an indication of the possible results of
steroid use, not conclusive evidence of harm.123 Similarly, as a result
of very few studies on HGH, there is little evidence as to its negative
health effects. 124 Therefore, there is inadequate information to come
to a determination on the health effects caused by these substances.
As a result, these performance-enhancing substances cannot be defini-
tively labeled as equally as dangerous as alcohol or cigarettes, and
these substances are much more common among the population than
steroids or HGH.125 Consequently, the harm caused by steroids is not
on the same level as the harm in Skinner.
Thus, the theories on the harm of these illegal substances is largely
the result of the imputation of the morals of the majority of the ath-
letic world, fear of the unknown and the emotion of the family mem-
bers of deceased athletes who used steroids. 126 The emotional factor
can be observed in the Congressional findings, as parents testified that
120. Id.
121. A Northeastern University research group, headed by Richard Melloni Jr., associate pro-
fessor of psychology, concluded that steroids injected into adolescent hamsters resulted in ag-
gressive behavior. Leroux, supra note 116.
122. The University of California reported that a study published in the Journal of Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome "[alnabolic steroid use causes decreased levels of HDL or 'good'
cholesterol, increased levels of LDL or 'bad' cholesterol, and serious liver toxicity within 12
weeks according to a study that measured the effects of anabolic steroids on men with HIV
wasting disease." Steve Tokar, Anabolic steroid use increases heart attack risk and causes liver
damage, Feb. 17, 2006, 1 1, http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/article/7884.
123. The University of California reported that a study published in the Journal of Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome "[alnabolic steroid use causes decreased levels of HDL or 'good'
cholesterol, increased levels of LDL or 'bad' cholesterol, and serious liver toxicity within 12
weeks according to a study that measured the effects of anabolic steroids on men with HIV
wasting disease." Id.
124. Mayo Clinic, Human growth hormone (HGH): Does it slow aging process?, http://www.
mayoclinic.com/health/growth-hormone/HA0030 (last visited Oct. 29, 2008).
125. "[O]f all the illegal substances available to teenagers, steroids pose the least 'immediate
threat' to public safety." Taylor, supra note 21, at 983.
126. Leroux, supra note 116.
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their children committed suicide because they used steroids. 127 Who is
to say that the suicide rate of steroid users is any higher than the rate
among the overall population?
Compiling comprehensive statistics on the suicide rate of steroid
users would most likely be difficult, as steroid use is largely an under-
ground culture. All of this information as to the adverse health effects
of steroids and other performance-enhancing substances supports the
argument in opposition to the CSA's secondary purpose, the protec-
tion of professional athletes.128 Therefore, after objectively evaluating
the available evidence, a court would likely find that there is inconclu-
sive evidence to establish that steroids and other illegal performance-
enhancing drugs are harmful.
ii. The Threat of Illegal Performance-Enhancing Substances in
Professional Sports
Moreover, statistical evidence does not indicate an immediate
threat of illegal performance-enhancing substances in the four major
professional sports.129 Specifically, the evidence indicates that the is-
sue is limited to the MLB and NFL.o30 This is evidenced by the lack of
positive test results and reports of illegal performance-enhancing sub-
stance purchases in the NBA and NHL. Thus, if the substances have
created an "immediate crisis" in professional sports, it is limited to the
MLB and NFL. Consequently, passing legislation that requires drug
testing for all major sports is excessive, particularly when the NFL is
voluntarily attempting to keep pace with the latest developments in
illegal substances.
The opposition to this argument claims the rampant use of steroids
by baseball pitchers and the previous logic that pitchers would not use
steroids, because of their mechanics defeats the idea that "'basketball
... does not lend itself to the use of steroids and performance-enhanc-
ing substances' because of the skill set that is required to be an elite
basketball player: agility, quickness, touch, and stamina . . ."131 Some
127. See Peck, supra note 21, at 1781 (citing Restoring Faith in America's Pastime: Evaluating
Major League Baseball's Efforts to Eradicate Steroid Use: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On
Government Reform, 109th Cong. 116-7 (2005) (testimony of Denise A. Garibaldi, Ph. D.) (ex-
plaining how steroid abuse by her son, to potentially compete at the NCAA and Major League
level, led to his severe depression and eventual suicide)).
128. Clean Sports Act, S. 1114 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2005).
129. "Statistical evidence of the severity of the problem of steroid use in MLB does not rise to
the level of the statistical evidence supporting the other situations where the special needs ex-
ception has been applied." Peck, supra note 21, at 1812.
130. Mitchell Report, supra note 33; Schrotenboer, supra note 33.
131. Laitner, supra note 31, at 206.
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imply that Congress' beliefs about the extent of the use of perform-
ance-enhancing substances in professional sports are sufficient to es-
tablish that there is an actual threat in professional sports.132 If this is
the case, Congress could create support for any legislation that it
wanted by stating a belief as fact. The facts are that concrete evidence
of steriod use only exists in the NFL and the MLB, and all indications
are that it is a bigger problem in the MLB.
iii. The Use of Illegal Performance-Enhancing Substances by
Adolescents
Additionally, there is a lack of reliable statistical evidence as to the
extent of the use of illegal performance-enhancing drugs by adoles-
cents. One puzzling aspect about the Congressional findings is that
they were based on the testimony of parents and experts. Why didn't
they anonymously survey student-athletes? Is it unreasonable to con-
clude that this type of survey would get to the heart of the problem
and shed more light on whether there is a problem of national signifi-
cance? On top of that, the Congressional findings described are mis-
leading as to the use of performance-enhancing drugs by
adolescents.13 3
The previous statement is not intended to indicate that Congress
misrepresented the truth. It is intended to indicate that the findings
are vague. The Congressional findings that "[t]he use of anabolic ster-
oids and other performance-enhancing substances by minors is a pub-
lic health problem of national significance . . . [and] over 500,000
teenagers have used performance-enhancing substances . . ." leads to
the conclusion that the term "performance-enhancing substances" in-
cludes the use of illegal and legal substances, such as creatine, protein,
and other over-the-counter dietary supplements. 134 The use of crea-
tine and protein is much more prevalent than the use of steroids and
HGH, as they are openly used amongst high school, college and pro-
132. "Nevertheless, Congress believes that steroid abuse plagues professional sports." Taylor,
supra note 21, at 980.
133. See Clean Sports Act, S. 1114, 109th Cong. § 2(a)(2)-(7) (2005).
134. Id. § 2(a)(1)-(2).
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fessional athletes.'35 Creatine and protein are sold over-the-counter,
and professional teams even provide them to their players.136
While some medical professionals do not condone the use of crea-
tine, the medical community and the Government have not labeled it
a dangerous substance, as there is also a lack of evidence to form a
valid conclusion as to its health effects. 137 However, studies have re-
vealed that between 2.9% and 11% of middle school and high school
students have used steroids. 38 As the studies indicate, the subject
group was not limited to athletes. Thus, the statistics reflect the use of
steroids by athletes and non-athletes, and expose a new trend in
American culture, the use of steroids by non-athletes. These non-ath-
letes use steroids for cosmetic purposes; similar to bodybuilders, they
want to gain body mass and muscle definition. 139 Of course, it is also
difficult to determine a precise percentage of adolescent non-athletes
who use steroids. 140 Therefore, there is a lack of reliable statistical
evidence as to the percentage of adolescents, specifically athletes, who
use illegal performance-enhancing substances.
iv. The Link Between Substance Use by Professional Athletes and
America's Youth
Foremost, it is undeniable that professional athletes act as role mod-
els for America's youth, but there are inherent problems with linking
the use of illegal performance-enhancing substances by professional
135. "An anonymous descriptive survey at a major university showed almost 50% of male
intercollegiate athletes use creatine, with a substantial number beginning their use during high
school. One survey of collegiate athletes showed that 29% of football, 21% of men's track, and
16% of women's track athletes voluntarily admitted to some use of PES. Recent reports show
that 8.2% of high school athletes used creatine, with up to one third admitting to daily use....
Dietary supplements compromise the majority of PES used by teenagers." Koch, supra note 2, at
311-2.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 311-2.
138. In a "study of high school students, 11% admitted to using androgenic and anabolic ster-
oids." Id at 312; "[A] study of nearly 5000 middle and high school students found that 5.4% of
boys and 2.9% of girls used steroids in the past year." Tracy Hampton, Researchers Address Use
of Performance-Enhancing Drugs in Nonelite Athletes, 6 JAMA 607, 607, Feb. 8, 2006, available
at http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/295/6/607.
139. Adrian Wilairat, Comment, Faster, Higher, Stronger? Federal Efforts to Criminalize Ana-
bolic Steroids and Steroid Precursors, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 377, 383 (2005).
140. "The proportion of users who do not play sports is not consistent across samples but
ranges as high as 38 percent." Kathleen E. Miller, Anabolic-Androgenic Steroid Use and Other
Adolescent Problem Behaviors: Rethinking the Male Athlete Assumption, 4 SOCIOLOGICAL PER-
SPECTIVEs 467, 472, Nov. 4, 2002, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1389688 (citing William
E. Buckley, Estimated Prevalence of Anabolic Steroid Use among Male High School Seniors, 23
JAMA, 3441-5, Dec. 16, 1988, available at http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/abstract/260/23/
3441).
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athletes to the use by adolescents. Certainly, as a result of the media
coverage on the issue, one could conclude that adolescents would not
have as much knowledge of the substances if professional athletes
were not using them. However, both CSA supporters and critics do
not claim that adolescents gain knowledge of the substances from the
media coverage of professional athletes. Instead, CSA supporters
claim that adolescents use the substances because of their desire to
emulate the professional athletes who use such substances.141 Dr. De-
nise Garibaldi, the mother of Rob Garibaldi, testified before Congress
that her son, who committed suicide after using steroids, said in refer-
ence to his steroid use, "I'm a baseball player, and this is what ballp-
layers do."1 42
Rob Garibaldi's death was a tragedy, but does the possibility that it
was indirectly caused by steroid use give the Government a compel-
ling interest? Critics point to Mark McGwire's widely publicized use
of Androsteindione (Andro), a steroid precursor, in 1998 as an exam-
ple of how adolescents emulate athletes.143 That season McGwire set
the single season home run record.144 There was a subsequent increase
in Andro sales among adolescents. 145 The flaw with that example is
that at that time, Andro was not a banned substance under the MLB's
policy or illegal under Federal law.146 Adolescents may have been em-
ulating McGwire or they may have just gained knowledge of Andro
from the publicity of his use. Would the use of an illegal substance
have a similar result amongst adolescents?
Logically, there is also a lack of information as to what portion of
adolescent users use the illegal substances as the result of knowledge
that professional athletes use them. This conclusion is based upon the
lack of evidence as to what percentage of adolescent athletes use the
illegal substances, and presumably non-athletes would not look to
professional athletes as role models. This is important, because "Con-
gress will need to compile evidence to show that the use of steroids by
children and young adults is dependent on professional use and, thus,
will be lessened if steroid use is deterred in professional sports." 147
However, there is inadequate evidence as to the extent of harm that
the use of performance-enhancing substances by professional athletes
141. See Garibaldi, supra note 31, at 720; Whitman, supra note 319, at 478; Laitner, supra note
31, at 214; Wilairat, supra note 139, at 383; Saka, supra note 32, at 359.
142. Garibaldi, supra note 31, at 719.
143. See Id. at 720; Wilairat, supra note 139, at 381-2.
144. Garibaldi, supra note 31, at 720.
145. Id.
146. Wilairat, supra note 139, at 381.
147. Lipscomb, supra note 21, at 339.
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has on adolescents because of the lack of information on the extent of
use by adolescent athletes. Thus, even though Congress argues that
the behavior of professional athletes has a substantial effect on the
health and safety of teenagers, the effect on the public is not analo-
gous to that of the railway workers.148
Some supporters of the proposed legislation argue that "use by
Olympic and professional athletes can create the impression of im-
plied legitimacy" and "can serve as a validation that steroids are their
ticket to a starting position, a college scholarship, or a career in pro-
fessional sports."l 49 This is definitely a viable possibility, but the rea-
soning of the argument could be extending to other professions in the
media spotlight. For instance, the reasoning could be used to support
imposing legislation that restrict actors and musicians from receiving
cosmetic surgery. Congress cannot reasonably be expected to protect
America's youth from exposure to all possible harms that may arise
from the actions of those in the media spotlight.
Congress may have recognized this flaw in its reasoning, as the lan-
guage of the Congressional findings is vague as to the link in use by
the two groups.o50 Section 6 of the findings reads that "surveys and
studies suggest a connection between the actual or alleged use of per-
formance-enhancing substances by college and professional athletes
and the increased use of these substances by children and teenag-
ers." 15' If Congress had such strong evidence in favor of the link they
probably would not need to use the word "suggest" or the phrase "ac-
tual or alleged." The assumption by many people seems to be that an
increase in the use of performance-enhancing substances, legal or ille-
gal, by young athletes is the result of use by professional athletes.
This assumption disregards the obvious rebuttal that young athletes
use the performance-enhancing substances because they want to gain
a competitive advantage in their sports.152 The desire to get a competi-
tive edge and play in the MLB fueled Rob Garibaldi's steroid use.' 53
148. The Court "strongly implies that if the government were to compel a private party to do
a search, then the search would probably be considered a search by an agent of the govern-
ment." Taylor, supra note 21, at 968.
149. Whitman, supra note 31, at 478.
150. Clean Sports Act, S. 1114, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
151. Id.
152. Lipscomb, supra note 21, at 341 (arguing that Congress must erase the idea from the
minds of children that steroids are necessary for success); "The problem with [the discourage-
ment] argument is two-fold. First, it assumes that children today know that their favorite players
are using steroids. It further assumes that once the CSA is in place, the children will opt not to
use steroids, because they will know that their favorite players are not using performance-en-
hancing substances." Taylor, supra note 21, at 984.
153. Garibaldi, supra note 31, at 717-8.
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When Dr. Garibaldi listed seven of the fears that teens feel, she ac-
knowledged five other motivating factors for teens to use illegal per-
formance-enhancing substances: (1) not making the team, (2) not
receiving a college scholarship, (3) going unnoticed by pro scouts, (4)
loss in the competition with girls and (5) muscle dysmorphia.15 4 The
bottom line is that if the kids want to "play at the professional level or
dominate at the current level, and taking steroids seems to them like
the only route, then it will not matter that their favorite sport star is
clean of enhancements thanks to a rigorous testing policy."155
v. The Use of Performance-Enhancing Substances as an Immediate
Crisis
The previously mentioned Supreme Court cases involved testing for
serious street drugs. The CSA does not propose the implementation
of such testing. The health dangers associated with street drugs, such
as amphetamines, cocaine and marijuana are quite serious and undis-
puted.156 Performance-enhancing substances do not present similar
health risks. As previously discussed, there is little known about their
potential adverse affects.
As a result, the use of performance-enhancing substances in profes-
sional sports do not create an "immediate crisis" similar to that in
Vernonia. This is illustrated by the lack of evidence as to the extent
that the substances are used and the insufficient knowledge as to their
adverse health effects. Despite the lack of information on the topic,
some critics have concluded that there is an immediate danger, but it
is one of a lesser degree than in Skinner and National Treasury.57 Of
course these critics relied on Congressional findings to support their
conclusion.158 The passing of the CSA by Congress without knowl-
edge as to the type or extent of harm caused by performance-enhanc-
ing substances and without knowledge as to the extent of the use of
the substances is at best protecting professional athletes from the un-
known dangers.
154. Id. at 721.
155. Laitner, supra note 31, at 214.
156. Marijuana use can result in short-term memory loss, respiratory problems associated with
cancer. Cocaine is highly addictive. The use of cocaine can result in auditory hallucinations or
sudden death, often caused by cardiac arrest or seizures. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/concern.htm; Amphetamines can result in increased
heart rate and blood pressure, heat intolerance, kidney damages, cerebral hemorrhage, seizures,
and hallucinations. NCAA, Choices In Sports, http://drugfreesport.com/choices/drugs/ampheta-
mine.html#I.
157. Peck, supra note 21, at 1811-2.
158. Id. at 1812, relying on Integrity in Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. (2005).
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Furthermore, professional athletes do not conduct "safety-sensitive
tasks." In Skinner, the railway employees conducted "safety-sensitive
tasks," as they were responsible for their lives, the lives of others and
millions of dollars in property.159 While some professional sports, such
as football and hockey, are dangerous activities, statistically, there is a
low potential for the loss of life.160 Also, even if the suspected health
risks of performance-enhancing substances are accepted as true, they
"do not impair an [athletes'] mental capabilities and functioning as
does an employee taking an illegal narcotic." 161 However, the CSA
supporters could make the argument that the testing under the CSA is
analogous to the required testing in Skinner, because they both can
negatively affect performance during activities. Obviously, the drugs
in Skinner impaired the railway workers abilities to operate the
trains.162 The CSA supporters could argue that because some per-
formance-enhancing substances create and alleged increased risk for
heart attacks,163 they create a risk on the playing field. However, this
argument would most likely fail, because in Skinner the drug and alco-
hol use had already resulted in millions of dollars in damage and the
loss of human life, and Congress cannot point to a single death as
conclusively attributable to performance-enhancing substances.164
Ironically, Congress fails to urge the professional leagues to require
more stringent policies on the illicit street drugs mentioned in the Su-
preme Court cases.
vi. Likelihood of the CSA Achieving Its Goals
Furthermore, some critics would argue that the goal of restoring the
integrity of professional sports is analogous to protecting the integrity
of U.S. Custom's officials, as steroids have tarnished the historical sig-
nificance of MLB records and baseball is America's pastime, 165 but
the potential compromise involved is of a different degree. The U.S.
Customs officials handle firearms, are the country's first line of de-
fense against the importation of illegal drugs and are the target of
bribes and violence. In contrast, professional athletes play their re-
159. Skinner v. Ry Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 607, 620 (1989).
160. Between 1999 and 2002, the U.S. Department of Labor recorded 219 fatal work injuries
for all professional athletes. U.S. Department of Labor, 1990-2002 Census of Fatal Occupational
Injuries Chart, at 34, available at http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cftb0186.pdf.
161. Brent D. Showalter, Comment, Steroid Testing Policies in Professional Sports: Regulated
by Congress or the Responsibility of the Leagues?, 17 MARO. SPORTs L. REV. 651, 675 (2007).
162. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607.
163. Tokar, supra [ 1.
164. Bishop, supra note 119.
165. Peck, supra note 21, at 1782-3.
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spective sport on a national stage for public entertainment. Thus, the
potential danger involved with the lack of integrity in professional
sports because of performance-enhancing substances does not arise to
the same level as the Customs officials in National Treasury.
Furthermore, there is also a lack of evidence to support the conclu-
sion that the CSA would accomplish its goal of restoring the integrity
of professional sports.166 As previously discussed, the indication is that
the use of illegal performance-enhancing substances is limited to the
NFL and MLB, and is primarily a serious problem for the MLB. Thus,
the second purpose is effectively frustrated, because the implication is
that the integrity of all professional sports has not been compromised,
but the integrity of the MLB and the NFL has been compromised.
When discussing the integrity of sports, it is important to be mindful
that "rules in sports change and grow with the sport, yet these changes
do not alter it to a less pure form." 67 Thus, what is currently consid-
ered cheating and a perversion of a sport, twenty years from now, may
be well within the boundaries of the rules. The constant change in
equipment exemplifies this theory.168 As a consequence, it is difficult
to label the integrity of any sport as compromised.
In further support of the conclusion that the CSA would not
achieve its goals, there is not a reliable test to detect HGH.169 Some
researchers claim that the development of such a reliable test for
HGH is years away, while others claim that it has already has been
developed but is waiting for mass production. 170 Regardless, the truth
is that if the CSA were passed today, the professional leagues would
not be able to detect this substance. This is particularly problematic;
because it appears that the detectable performance-enhancing sub-
stances are not the biggest problem.171
As a consequence, there is little available evidence to support the
conclusion that if the CSA were passed it would effectively address
either one of its purposes. This is the result of the fact that the hazard
presented by the CSA is hypothetical. It follows that as the State of
166. See Clean Sports Act, S. 1114, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
167. Laitner, supra note 31, at 208; Norman Fost, Comment, "I Was Like Whoa": A Commen-
tary on Shapiro's Performance Enhancement and the Control of Attributes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
115, 116 (1991).
168. "In some sports, athletes can enhance their performance technologically by changing
their equipment. Tennis racquets, golf balls, and baseball gloves have evolved enormously over
the last century, and the speed of change seems to be increasing." Henry T. Greely, Symposium,
Disabilities, Enhancements, and the Meaning of Sports, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 99, 121 (2004).
169. Taylor, supra note 19, at 985.
170. Michael S. Schmidt, Agency Will Increase Blood Tests for H.G.H., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/sports/othersports/02doping.html.
171. Taylor, supra note 21, at 974.
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Georgia failed to make an indication of a concrete danger demanding
the departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule in Chandler,
Congress has similarly failed to show an indication of a concrete dan-
ger that is worthy of overriding the individual athlete's Fourth
Amendment right. Thus, just as the State of Georgia did not provide a
compelling interest, Congress has also failed to provide one.
Therefore, in evaluating the evidence, a court would likely find that
the CSA fails to provide evidence of a concrete danger in support of
the conclusion that preventing the use of performance-enhancing sub-
stances is a compelling interest for public safety. An analysis of the
protection of sensitive information as a compelling interest is not
needed, because it is inapplicable to the CSA.
D. Balancing the Private and Governmental Interest to Determine a
Special Need
The Chandler Court "outlined three elements to consider when de-
termining whether the Government has successfully demonstrated a
special need where public safety is the asserted compelling interest:
(1) whether the drug use is an actual threat and not a hypothetical
concern; (2) whether the drug testing is aimed at actually detecting
drug use and not simply deterring it; and (3) whether there is a genu-
ine threat to public safety."1 72 After analyzing the CSA, a court would
likely determine that the drug use is a hypothetical concern; the drug
testing is only aimed at detecting some of the drug use; and there is
not a genuine threat to public safety. Therefore, even though profes-
sional athletes have a diminished expectation of privacy, a court
would likely find that the Government does not present a special need
that justifies overriding the individual athletes' privacy interests. Thus,
a court would most likely find the searches to be unreasonable and in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, the outcome would
likely require a finding contrary to Congress' findings. As Congress'
findings are entitled to substantial deference, a conservative court
could rule otherwise. 73 The reality of the situation is that those test-
ing for the substances will likely always be one step behind those using
the substances. 174 The next probable step in performance-enhancing
technology is gene therapy, which is almost undetectable, because the
172. Id.
173. Turner Broadcasting System, 512 U.S. at 665-6.
174. "Unfortunately, those determined to win at any cost will inevitably find a way to cheat."
Rick Collins, Symposium, Changing the Game: The Congressional Response to Sports Doping
VIA the Anabolic Steroid Control Act, 40 NEw ENG. L. REv. 753, 762 (2006).
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gene therapy would be used to manufacture copies of existing
genes.175 Thus, it is important to explore the possible alternatives.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES TO THE CSA
Furthermore, if the CSA is truly intended to protect adolescent ath-
letes from using illegal performance-enhancing substances, it is an in-
direct approach to resolving the issue. The attempt at this indirect
approach indicates that the CSA is nothing more than a scare tactic,
intended to serve as a symbol of sportsmanship for America's youth.
Scholars on the topic seem to agree with this view. One commentator
expressed a similar view when he wrote "[t]he real problem is that the
emphasis on success in sports has lead to much higher levels of steroid
use in kids and teenagers. A better solution than the Clean Sports Act
would be legislation that addressed the drug enhancement issue with
kids and the future development of sports." 176
If Congress truly intends to protect adolescent athletes from the po-
tential harm of performance-enhancing drugs, it should pass legisla-
tion to provide a vehicle for local school districts to conduct drug
tests.177 Requiring student-athletes at public schools to submit to ran-
dom drug testing is constitutional, because they have a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy. 178 Congress could also take steps towards
educating America's youth on the potential dangers of these sub-
stances.179 Apparently, Congress recognizes the need for this step, as
it took some action to provide funding for educating children on the
effects of anabolic steroids.s 0 Congress could take similar action for
college athletics. Congress would most likely run into a similar Fourth
Amendment problem with mandatory testing in the NCAA. It could
get avoid the problem by providing federal funding for the scholastic
institutions that encourage the NCAA to adopt the CSA standards.
If Congress insists on taking action to rid professional sports of per-
formance-enhancing drugs, it could give tax incentives to the profes-
sional leagues that adopt and implement a policy that is consistent
175. Greely, supra note 168, at 118.
176. Laitner, supra note 31, at 194.
177. See Taylor, supra note 21, at 986 (arguing that the implementation of laws for drug test-
ing high school and college athletes would likely lead to the dissolution of anabolic steroids in
professional sports); Tim Walker, Comment, Missing the Target: How Performance-Enhancing
Drugs Go Unnoticed and Endanger the Lives of Athletes, 10 VILL. SPORTs & ErNr. L.J. 181, 199
(2003); Laitner, supra note 29, at 214.
178. Acton, 515 U.S. at 646.
179. Lipscomb, supra note 21, at 341; Laitner, supra note 31, at 194, 214; Walker, supra note
177, at 201.
180. Saka, supra note 32, at 348 (citing 42 U.S.C.S. § 290bb-25f (West Supp. 2004)).
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with the USADA standards.181 Congress could also authorize "the In-
ternal Revenue Service to levy a special tax on the income of profes-
sional athletes who use federally controlled performance-enhancing
substances illegally." 182 Regardless of the future of the CSA, Congress
should pass legislation to regulate the contents of all dietary supple-
ments by the FDA. 83 Currently, there is not a mechanism available to
hold manufacturers of these products accountable for what they mar-
ket.'8 The lack of regulation leaves the unsuspecting consumer to
take a potentially dangerous risk.185 They could test positive or have
an adverse health affect, from an over-the-counter product, because
many of these products contain compounds that serve as steroid pre-
cursors or stimulants.' 86
Congress could also ensure that when a player tests positive for or is
found to have purchased a substance that is illegal under Federal law,
he or she is investigated and prosecuted. 87 The athlete should be
prosecuted for breaking federal law, because any other citizen would
be prosecuted. Time in a federal penitentiary is a bigger deterrent
than a league suspension, as freedom is a great asset. But in the in-
ternet age, prosecuting some of these sales could prove problem-
atic.' 88 Therefore, either the buyer or the seller should be prosecuted.
Regardless of which one is the target, the action will serve as an effec-
tive deterrent on the industry.
Additionally, the players' unions possess too much power for the
two sides to reach a reasonable agreement on the topic. The lax test-
ing policies can largely be attributed to the threats to strike by the
players' unions during the collective bargaining process. To thwart
181. Lipscomb, supra note 21, at 344.
182. Mitten, supra note 32, at 807-8.
183. Rhitesh Dhar, MD, Cardiovascular Toxicities of Performance-Enhancing Substances in
Professional Sports, 2005, http://www.mayoclinicproceedings.com/inside.asp?AID=1031&UID=
(last visited September 25, 2009); Selig & Mafred, supra note 32, at 58-9; Walker, supra note 177,
at 209.
184. Id.
185. "[B]efore regulation the FDA has the burden of proving that the dietary supplement in
question is adulterated, which is a very high burden to meet. Therefore, the FDA primarily is
only able to regulate dietary supplements after they have been marketed and sold. Consumers,
subsequently, are able to purchase and use unsafe dietary supplements free from FDA regula-
tion." Saka, supra note 32, at 347; Greely, supra note 168, at 120-1.
186. Id.
187. Taylor, supra note 21, at 987 (arguing for imposing federal criminal sanctions on athletes
who possess illegal performance-enhancing substances without a prescription); Mitten, supra
note 32, at 807.
188. "The report states that because of the simplicity of web searches, and the overwhelming
complications involved with mail inspection, steroid dealers are very difficult to detect and pros-
ecute." Laitner, supra note 31, at 211.
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these threats, Congress could require that in the event that the leagues
and unions are unable to come to an agreement on a drug policy, they
are required to arbitrate.189 The Congressional action would be appro-
priate, because the collective bargaining process has failed to ade-
quately address the issue, it would avoid the complex constitutional
issues that arise under the proposed legislation, and it would offer the
leagues and the player's autonomy over the regulations that will im-
pact them. 190
Lastly, even though it is not a popular position, legalizing steroid
use for adults, should be considered. Dr. Norman Frost sets forth a
strong argument in support of it. He says that if they were legalized,
the Government could regulate the industry, which would help to en-
sure the safety of the substances and dosages.191 Government regula-
tion would assist in determining the long-term effects of steroids and
create revenue, while putting illegal operations out of business.192
Also, those with ethical qualms about the use of performance-enhanc-
ing substances because they create an uneven playing field would be
satisfied, because everyone would have equal access to them.193 Of
course if this highly unlikely scenario were to occur, the individual
leagues would also have to approve the use of the substances.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the CSA has two admirable goals, to deter the use of
performance-enhancing substances by adolescents and to restore the
integrity of professional sports. Despite these goals, it is unconstitu-
tional under the Fourth Amendment, because the Government does
not present a compelling interest and when balanced against the pri-
vate interest, the Governmental interest does not create a special
need. There are better methods to address the problem with
America's youth and professional athletes, but these issues should be
resolved separately.
The Mitchell Report was a step in the right direction for MLB,194
but if the past is any indication of the future, the battle with illegal
performance-enhancing substances is not likely to end soon. Congress
189. Saka, supra note 32, at 357; Lisa Pike Masteralexis, Symposium, Drug Testing Provisions:
An Examination of Disparities in Rules and Collective Bargaining Agreement Provisions, 40 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 775, 775 (2006) (arguing that the issue of performance-enhancing drugs should be
addressed in collective bargaining and not on the floor of Congress).
190. Saka, supra note 32, at 357.
191. Leroux, supra note 116.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Mitchell Report, supra note 33.
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should undertake one or more of the constitutional alternatives, but
the unfortunate possibility is that the root of the problem may be soci-
ety's implicit encouragement of the use of performance-enhancing
substances.195 This apparent encouragement may be evidenced by the
observation that in America, sports "serve as a model of the larger
society."196 If the ultimate problem lies with America's society, to
make a change and action must be taken, which is more drastic than
proposed legislation.
195. Whitman, supra note 31, at 488.
196. Laitner, supra note 31, at 192; Walker, supra note 177, at 181; Greely, supra note 168, at
99.
